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Abstract - France standard board (UTE) has published
IEC/EN 62305-2 in January 2005, more than one year
before publication of the standard at IEC or EN level.
Purpose was to gain experience when the voting stage
occurred for this standard in 2006. UTE has also
developped a specific software to apply this risk
assessment methode. By now we have more than 2
years of application of both standard and software.
The software called Jupiter is just a tool but it helps a
lot in introducing data and making easy calculations.
This software introduces features such as drawing of
the building to calculate accurate collection areas,
design of the lines and of circuitry inside the building,
evaluation of fire risk existing inside the structure,
accurate selection of the needed SPDs as well as an
automatic provider of protection solution. This means
that studies for simple building may be done by
contractors when more complete studies still need to
be done by experts but their task becomes a lot easier.
This is perfectly in line with the Qualifoudre
qualification scheme introduced by INERIS in France.
We have now applied this risk method on a large
amount of structures with various risks (explosive,
radioactive, fire ...). Purpose of this paper is to share
this experience and to discuss applicability of some
parameters introduced in the standard IEC/EN
62305-2.
1 INTRODUCTION
IEC 62305-2 standard for risk assessment has been
published in Europe as EN 62305-2, at the latest by
October 2006 depending on the countries. When the
standard can be implemented or not at IEC level it has to
be implemented by law in Europe. France has decided to
remove immediately all his previous risk evaluation
methods as early as April 2006. This standard is part of
the group of new standards that IEC TC81 (International
Electrical Commission - technical committee N°81 in
charge of lightning protection of structures) has released.
62305-1 deals with general information regarding
lightning
62305-2 deals with risk assessment : do I need protection
and if answer is yes which one ?
62305-3 deals with lightning protection systems (LPS) :
how to set-up such a system and select its components ?
62305-4 deals with lightning electromagnetic pulse
(LEMP) : how to set-up and design shields and bonding
as well as selection of SPDs (surge protective device)
used for equipotentiality ?
France was using so far its own standards for risk (either
risk against direct lightning NFC 17-100 or risk against
induced surges C 15-443. From time to time we were also
using IEC 61662 (ancestor of IEC 62305-2) for complex
sites such as military or nuclear plants. Recognizing that
method described in 62305-2 is more powerful and
consistent than previous methods, French National
Committee has decided to publish EN 62305-2 in a draft
mature version in January 2005 under number 17-100-2.
Purpose of this was to get experience on this method and
been able to make comments and propose improvements
especially at CENELEC level. Since publication of this
document the method has been extensively applied by the
authors on many site including chemical sites, explosive
sites as well as other industrial sites.
2 IEC/EN 62305-2 METHOD
The new method is not so different in essence from the
original one (IEC 61662) but many parameters have been
refined. Opposed to other French methods, this one is
purely based on probabilistic calculations and the
parameters are coming from international scientific
studies which have been largely documented and
published (SIPDA, ICLP ...). This is very important as
users of the method are sometimes suspicious of the
validty of some parameters.
4 sources of damage are defined : flashes to a structure,
flashes near a structure, flashes to a service and flashes
near a service.
3 types of damages are defined : injuries to living beings;
physical damage (damage to the structure i.e. destruction
by direct hit, fire, explosion ...) and failures of electrical
equipments.
4 types of losses are defined : loss of human life, loss of
service to the public, loss of cultural heritage and loss of
economic value (structure and its content, service and loss
of activity). For each of this loss a risk is defined.
The total risk is then calculated has a sum of risk
components defined below :
Risk component for a structure due to flashes direct to the
structure :
• RA: component related to injuries of living
beings caused by touch and step voltages in the zones up
to 3 m outside the structure;
• RB: component related to physical damage
caused by dangerous sparking inside the structure
triggering fire or explosion, which may also endanger the
environment;
• RC: component related to failure of internal
systems caused by LEMP;
Risk component for a structure due to flashes near the
structure :
• RM: component related to failure of internal
systems caused by LEMP;
Risk components for a structure due to flashes to a
service connected to the structure :
• RU: component related to injuries of living
beings caused by touch voltage inside the structure, due
to lightning current injected in a line entering the
structure.
• RV: component related to physical damage (fire
or explosion triggered by dangerous sparking between
external installation and metallic parts generally at the
entrance point of the line into the structure) due to
lightning current transmitted through or along incoming
services;
• RW: component related to failure of internal
systems caused by overvoltages induced on incoming
lines and transmitted to the structure.;
Risk component for a structure due to flashes near a
service connected to the structure
• RZ: component related to failure of internal
systems caused by overvoltages induced on incoming
lines and transmitted to the structure;
For each of the risk associated to the 4 types of losses
(called R1 to R4) and which need to be considered for the
studied structure, the total risk will be calculated as a sum
of the above described risk components.
Each of the risk components itself will be calculated by
using the generic formula given below
RX = NXPXLX
NX is the number of dangerous events for that risk
PX is the probability of damage for that risk;
LX is the consequent loss for that risk
And X can take the values A, B, C, M, U, V, W or Z
The risk component is defined as the number of lightning
strikes on the building multiplied by the probability that
this strike lead to a damage (hopefully not all strikes will
create a damage) and multiplied by a loss factor taking
care of the amount of losses (how many people are
possibly injured, what are the possible protection
measures)
For risk R1 to R3 the total risk need to be lower than the
acceptable risk RT given in the standard.
Table 1 : Typical values of tolerable risk RT
Types of loss
Loss of human life (R1)
Loss of service to the public
(R2) and Loss of cultural
heritage (R3)
RT (year-1)
1(T5
1(T3
For risk R4 there is no tolerable risk as the economic
perception is different from a small company to a large
group. Calculation is then made by comparing annual
amount of losses without protection, annual amount of
residual losses as soon as protection measures are
implemented and annual cost of protection measures
taking care of maintenance. The result is then an annual
saving for the owner of the structure.
Let's imagine a telecom center (service to the public)
which is located inside a building which is a national
heritage. The owner of the building is willing to know if
lightning protection will provide some savings to him. In
addition, risk for loss of human life needs to be
considered as there are some people inside (workers and
customers). In such case risk R1, R2, R3 and R4 will be
calculated. For each of the risk the appropriate protection
measures may differ. For the simplest case of a building
where only protection of human being is considered then
only R1 will be calculated. R1 is also the risk which is
calculated for sites where environemtal risk need to be
addressed.
When risk cannot be sufficiently reduced, it is possible to
defined specific zones inside the building to better protect
the areas which are the more dangerous and avoid
overprotecting the complete building.
3 TOOLS DEVELOPED TO APPLY THIS
METHOD
As previously mentioned, this IEC standard became a
French document in January 2005. As such it is used and
will be used more and more and will replace existing
documents dealing with the same topic. To allow the use
of this standard for most of the lightning professionals it
has been decided to provide tools to the user in order to
facilitate his job. These tools are described below.
3.1 Forms
INERIS has developed in France a qualification for
lightning protection professionals. This is called
Qualifoudre. Under this qualification scheme, a
professional can claim expertise for site survey,
production of lightning protection equipment, set-up of
protection measures and control of installations. His
expertise in the selected field is attested by a letter which
can be S for professional being able to work on simple
structures (a house, small office) or C for complex
structures (chemical plant for example) or even I for
intermediate ones (not a simple nor a complex structure).
The qualification is approved by the Lightning Protection
Association (APF), the Ministry of ecology, the Ministery
of defense and the Federation of the insurance companies.
For companies which are claiming study capability "C"
their ability to use UTE C 17-100-2 risk method needs to
be proved. Under the Qualifoudre scheme many helping
tools are provided to qualified companies, one of them
being a form to facilitate on site data collection. As a
matter of fact, the new method needs a better cooperation
between the plant manager and the lightning engineer.
This form (which is sent prior to the survey to the plant
manager) is then useful to be sure that there is no
misunderstanding on the amount of time the plant
technicians need to involve for that action from one side
and to be sure that, on the other side, at data collection
time, no parameters is forgotten by the lightning engineer
Table 2: Data collection form
Data collection form of a structure
to be protected against lightning
STRUCTURE (N°, name, function)
Dimensions (Length, width, maximum
height, height of chimney)
Relative situation of the structure
Number of floor
Type of wall (concrete, metal, wood...)
Type of roof (concrete, metal, asbestos
cement, tile...)
Type of soil inside structure (concrete,
linoleum, wood...)
Distance between the metal frame
Resistivity of the ground (ohm.m)
Type of soil (clay, granite, silica, humus...)
Are metal part equipotentially bonded ?
Are reinforcements of the concrete
connected into a mesh ? (mesh size ?)
Numbers of electrodes for lightning earth.
Surge counters (indication on the counter)
Installation of SPDs on the powerlines (type
of protection, state).
Fire protection (simple detection, automatic
extinction, extinguisher, presence of
fireman or time before their intervention)
B1
20x20x10
m
Isolated
1
Concrete
Tiles
Concrete
2m
300 Q..m
Clay
Yes
0,2
2
1(0)
Type 1
SPDs
Manual fire
extingui-
shers
Fig. 1. First page (example) of Qualifoudre data
collection form
In addition, under the Qualifoudre banner, an internet
forum offers possibility to the users of the method to
exchange on problems encountered or even to ask for
some help.
3.2 Jupiter software
The software is taking into account all the parameters
described in the standard and offer to the user practical
facilities such as the possibility to test immediately
various possible protection means effect and selection of
the most convenient one.
Based on the data collected on site, the parameters
describing the structure can be filled. There are
interesting features in the software such as true
calculation of the collection area taking care of real
dimensions or evaluation based on fire brigade rules of
the fire risk.
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Fig. 1. Exemple of calculation of the collection area
When the data regarding the structure and its connected
services are introduced the risk calculation can start. This
lead to a diagram as in Figure 2.
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Fig. 2. Typical screen where the protection measures have
not been implemented
As it can been seen there is a graphic display of the
conclusions of the analysis : the building is not self
protected. The user of the software should then
introduced protection measures in order to bring the total
risk below the red bottom line (tolerable risk)
Fig. 3. Typical screen where the protection measures have
been implemented
With this software you also have access to many features.
One of them is the green/red color code. Every risk
component which is red is greater than tolerable risk. It is
green in the other case. It is then very easy to determine
the part or the zone of structure which needs a special
care. This is reported on a specific screen where influence
of each zone can be appreciated.
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Fig. 4. Influence of various zones on the total risk
The software propose some protection solution in an
automatic way that the user can use or not. The economic
evaluation and selection of appropriate SPD is also very
easy due to a large data base of parameters and cost that
the user can manage by himself based on his own
experience.
3 APPLICATION OF JUPITER ON EXPLOSIVE
SITES
.Sometimes the danger is very high and the potential
damages are important. It is the case for installations with
risk of explosion and with people in the lethal zone. If the
duration of the risk of explosion is not well indicated, the
calculated risk can be overestimated. In this case, it
happens that the addition of protections with the best
possible effectiveness does not reduce the risk under the
tolerable value of 10-5. This too huge risk will in fact
mask the other risk which even if less important are not
minors. A good example is the risk of fire which is often
present when there is explosive risk. It is then necessary
to consider 2 situations: a normal situation during which
the risk is for example the risk fire and a degraded
situation where explosion can occur.
Let us suppose that the building to be protected is a
warehouse storing solvent. Storage is very flammable and
the interior of the building is classified ATEX (level 2)
which means explosive atmosphere for short durations
not exceeding a cumulative annual time of 100 hours. As
the fire risk is present for 1 800 hours we need to consider
this duration. But, by considering that storage is explosive
and that the people are present in the zone during 1800
hours (even if the potential explosive risk is present for
only 100 hours), the risk cannot be reduced with best
available protections means.
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Fig. 5. Protection measures have not been implemented
Calculation must then be carried out for 2 situations. In
normal situation only the fire risk is considered and
duration is 1 800 hours. It is possible to use protection
means to reduce the risk to a tolerable value. In degraded
situation, the explosion risk is considered but the duration
of presence of the people in the zone at the risk is only
100 hours.
Figure 8 shows that the risk calculated for duration of 100
hours with explosive atmosphere is lower than the
tolerable value. The probability that the lightning strikes
the warehouse and be the trigger of an explosion is low
due to the short duration of 100 hours.
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When calculation is carried out for various situations, it is
then necessary to install the protection means which
reduce the risk in all the cases. In the above example, the
protection means which reduces the risk as in figure 7
meets the need.
4 NEED FOR CLARIFICATION
No doubt that IEC/EN 62305-2) is a powerful tool.
However, it is needed to clarify a few things to cover all
the needs of the French lightning protection community
(and perhaps of other countries too).
More than 150 buildings have been studied in France
using UTE C 17-100-2 method over a period of 2 year.
Plants had different characteristics and covered a wide
range of industrial site and buildings. Based on
application of the method on a large number of cases it
appeared that a few parameters needed to be better
defined.
4.1 SPDs
There is no relationship between SPD characteristics and
probability values that you can select in the standard. Of
course, when you are an expert you know how to select
the appropriate SPD and if one SPD is better than
another. But who is really able to select the probability
associated with an SPD which is behaving better than the
requirements given by the calculation. An SPD protecting
at 1 kV for a fixed value of current offers a better
protection than an SPD protecting at 1,5 kV for the same
value of current. How can we quantify this? If the needed
protection level is 1,5 kV and the needed lightning
discharge capacity is 10 kA 10/350 who could say which
of the following SPDs is the best? SPD1 has a current
capability of 40 kA 10/350 and protective level of 1,5 kV.
SPD2 has a current capability of 15 kA 10/350 only but a
protective level of 1 kV. It is already not easy to say what
is the best choice but it is furthermore difficult to
associate probabilities to both. Mainly the document is
related to probabilities associated to currents withstand
which is probably one of the good parameter to avoid
flashover problems at the entrance of installation (but not
the only one) but which is quite irrelevant when
downstream protection is needed (coordinated SPDs). In
addition, to mix SPD with lightning protection level of
the LPS creates confusion. What to do when there is no
LPS and direct lightning is not relevant? SPD are
clarified in Europe by type related to testing capabilities.
To have a SPD Type 1 (the one used in case of LPS)
defined for a lightning protection level 3 for example can
only create confusion. Better coordination is needed
between LPS and SPD standards and SPD probabilities
should be better defined in the risk standard. Jupiter
provides some tools to help selecting appropriate SPDs
but the standard should be more detailed regarding this
issue and avoid confusion in the head of the reader.
4.2 Concept of coordinated SPDs
You need to use SPDs in front of each sensitive
equipment and SPDs should all be coordinated together.
But if you use only entrance SPDs (SPDs for
equipotentiality) and other SPDs in front of a particular
zone (with a high fire risk for example) are you
complying with criteria to consider you have a
coordinated system? It seems that it is not the case based
on present definition when in practice such a protection at
needed place will be sufficient.
4.3 Shielding of cables
The key parameter is the shield resistance. Who is able to
give this value in practice? Surely not the electrical
technician responsible for the building. Should we make
measurements? Try to locate the manufacturer reference
number and try to get data from him? If you have many
days in front of view it is perhaps possible but for most of
the cases a simplification is needed. This non practicality
will lead countries to develop alternative method for their
contractors and this approach is going against the initial
target.
4.4 Number of people injured inside a building in case
of a lightning strike
In some cases this data can be obtained from discussions
between the structure owner or manager and the lightning
expert but in a lot of other cases this is quite difficult to
achieve. If you use the generic values proposed by the
standard you will get a protection scheme which is clearly
over designed. In some cases you will not be able to
reduce the risk below the tolerable risk and this means
according to the French law that you may not be able to
run your plant! The only remaining solution is then to
install storm detectors and stop this critical activity during
stormy periods.
4.5 External zones
They are only considered for the risk of touch and step
voltage. But if you have an explosive area in the building
or if you store dangerous products with possible impact
on environment it is likely that people outside the
building will be injured and not due to step and touch
voltage. This needs to be considered. In addition, when a
toxic cloud is released to the atmosphere in case of surges
generated by a lightning strike, how should we consider
the number of people potentially injured? 1 000, possibly
more ... This should be better defined in the standard. In
the same way, if a truck is bringing explosive material
from the outside, its presence outside of the building
should be also taking into account in the explosive risk.
Protection of external zone should take into account other
aspects than the pure risk of touch and step voltage.
4.4 Storm detectors
So far, the only solution in some cases to reduce the risk
below tolerable risk is to use a storm detector. Simple
way of doing so is to consider that there is nobody in the
dangerous zone in such a case (once again this does not
cover the risk of people being outside the building or of a
released chemical cloud spreading around). But in fact, a
storm detector has also an efficiency. It may not detect
100% of all storms. In some cases, the user will change
the settings in order to avoid too many false alarms
leading to a detection ratio of less than 100%. In such a
case, such a ratio cannot be introduced in the method. Of
course, there is no standard for such storm detectors so
far in spite of some attempt in France and at Cenelec
level, but we cannot ignored such a tool for the risk
evaluation and a probability should be associated to it in
the same way it is for SPDs or LPS.
4 CONCLUSIONS
French national committee has decided in January 2005 to
implement the draft international standard IEC 62305-2
into a French document. This is clearly supported by most
of the actors and especially INERIS which has included
this requirement in his qualification scheme named
Qualifoudre. To support this development, tools have
been developed and UTE, the French electrical standard
body, has developed a powerful software named Jupiter.
This will allow a greater number of people to use the
method. At the same time, to allow this general use, a few
parameters need to be clarified. They are accessible to the
lightning expert, even if in some cases it may be quite
difficult to get the data or relate these data to probability
values. But for less skilled users, the task may be
discouraging. The risk calculation being so powerful it
should be a pity to not make the necessary clarifications
which will make this document the only reference in
lightning risk management.
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